The Rivers State Crisis: A Constitutional Debate
The Rivers State Crisis: A Constitutional Debate
By Hon. Lawson Oghenetejirhi
Sorhue, SAL, SANL
Introduction:
The political crisis in Rivers State has ignited a fierce debate about the limits of presidential power in Nigeria.
Can
The President Constitutionally Suspend A Sitting Governor?
The notion of a Nigerian President suspending a sitting Governor, Deputy Governor, and State House of Assembly strikes at the heart of federalism and separation of powers. Let’s examine the legal framework and the contending perspectives.
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria 1999 (as amended) is unequivocal about the removal of state
officials. Section 188[2]
outlines the impeachment process, vesting exclusive authority in the State
House of Assembly to remove a Governor or Deputy Governor for gross misconduct,
following a two-thirds majority vote after investigation. Section 189[3] addresses permanent
incapacity, again placing the decision with the state legislature. The
President has no role here—a point reinforced by judicial precedent. In A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia State & Ors[4],
the Supreme Court affirmed that state autonomy under the Constitution precludes
federal interference in the governance of states unless explicitly provided.
Moreover, Section 191(1)[5] mandates that the
Deputy Governor assumes office if the Governor is removed or incapacitated,
while Section 191(2)[6]
designates the Speaker as Acting Governor if both are unavailable. This
succession plan ensures democratic continuity, a principle upheld in Dapianlong v. Dariye[7],
where the Supreme Court would have invalidated an unconstitutional removal of a
Governor but for procedural issues made the case it fall through as evidenced
in the position of Acholonu JSC “It is disheartening and disturbing that a
case is lost because of the inability of counsel
briefed to determine or ascertain the procedural law that would enable the
party complaining of infraction to have due access to the court, failing
ignobly”. This
despite the procedure defects emphasises adherence to constitutional
procedures.
If
President Tinubu suspended the Rivers State Governor, Deputy
Governor, and House of Assembly, leaving only the judiciary, it would
appear to violate these provisions. The President’s absence from this framework
raises a critical question: Where does the authority for such an action
originate?
Proponents might invoke Section 305[8], which empowers the
President to declare a state of emergency in cases of war, insurrection, or
breakdown of public order—potentially applicable to Rivers State’s political
unrest. The National Assembly has reportedly sanctioned this declaration and
possibly all attending issues, invoking Section 11(4)[9],
which states:
“At any time when any House of Assembly of a State is unable to perform its functions by reason of the situation prevailing in that State, the National Assembly may make such laws for the peace, order and good government of that State with respect to matters on which a House of Assembly may make laws as may appear to the National Assembly to be necessary or expedient until such time as the House of Assembly is able to resume its functions; and any such laws enacted by the National Assembly pursuant to this section shall have effect as if they were laws enacted by the House of Assembly of the State.”
In A.G.
Plateau State v. A.G. Federation[10], the Supreme Court
acknowledged the President’s emergency powers but stressed their limits. Even
under a state of emergency, the Constitution does not authorize the suspension
of elected officials. Section 11(4)[11]
allows the National Assembly—not the President—to assume legislative duties if
a State House of Assembly cannot function, but this is temporary and
legislative in scope—not executive. The Supreme Court in A.G. Federation v. A.G. Lagos State[12]
clarified that federal intervention must respect state autonomy unless
explicitly justified by law.
The National Assembly’s
sanctioning of the emergency aligns with Section 305(2)[13],
which requires approval within two days if in session. If this approval extends
to suspensions, it could signal legislative backing for the President’s
actions. Yet, the Constitution’s silence on suspending elected executives
suggests a gap: Does Section 11(4)[14]’s
legislative authority implicitly stretch to endorsing executive suspensions?
This remains untested.
Some might argue that a
Governor’s failure to maintain order, coupled with a paralyzed House of
Assembly, invites federal action, as seen in Obasanjo v. Nwobodo[15], where emergency measures were debated. The National Assembly’s
invocation of Section 11(4)[16] could bolster this,
suggesting a crisis severe enough to justify extraordinary measures. Yet, the
Constitution’s insistence on legislative oversight and succession hints
otherwise. Does the President’s role in emergencies, even with National
Assembly support, extend beyond security to ousting elected officials? The
tension between federal power and state rights fuels this debate.
Is Appointing an
Administrator Constitutional?
The appointment of an
administrator to replace a suspended Governor further complicates the legal
landscape. Is this a pragmatic fix or an unconstitutional overstep?
Section
191[17]
provides a clear succession line: Deputy Governor, then Speaker. The
Constitution recognizes no “administrator”
role, a point underscored in Inakoju
v. Adeleke[18], where the Supreme
Court struck down an unlawful removal of a Governor, emphasizing that only
constitutional processes can alter state leadership. Appointing an unelected
official bypasses this framework, undermining the democratic will expressed in
elections, a principle rooted in Section
1(2)[19],
which prohibits governance except under the Constitution.
Supporters might argue
that an administrator restores stability in a crisis, especially if the Deputy
Governor and Speaker are embroiled in conflict. The National Assembly’s
sanctioning of the emergency under Section 11(4)[20] could lend weight here,
implying that the state’s legislative paralysis justifies federal intervention
beyond normal succession.
This argument may be
given Practicality, as may be deduced from The Plateau State Emergency Case (A.G. Plateau State v. A.G. Federation)[21]. The case provides a
situation where the Supreme Court struck out the matter on the ground that the
administrator didn't authorize the institution of the action and so by
upholding the objection relating to the fact that the administrator didn't
authorize the suit, the Supreme Court indirectly recognised the validity of the
suspension and the appointment of the Administrator but didn't rule on its
unconstitutionality.
The question then is:
does this override the law? While the Court’s
decision implied a level of recognition for the administrator’s authority, it
did not establish that such actions were constitutionally valid. This contrasts
with Ladoja v. INEC[22],
where the Supreme Court reinstated a governor who had been removed outside
constitutional bounds, rejecting expediency as a defense. In that case, the
Court was straightforward in upholding the Constitution over political
convenience.
What if the succession
line is compromised and the House of Assembly can’t act? The
National Assembly’s Section 11(4)[23] powers address legislative
gaps, but the Constitution offers no executive workaround beyond elections or
impeachment. Does legislative approval of an emergency implicitly validate
an administrator, or does strict adherence to Section 191[24]
protect against abuse? This question lingers unresolved.
Where Does the
President’s Confidence Come From?
If these actions lack
constitutional backing, what emboldens the President? Three factors stand out:
a stretched reading of Section 305[25],
historical precedents and Judicial cum legislative implicit recognition.
Twisting Section 305[26]
Section
305(3)[27]
lists emergency triggers, while Section
305(4)[28]
requires a Governor’s request—waived under Section 305(5)[29] if the Governor
fails to act and national security is threatened. Section 305(6)[30] demands National
Assembly approval within two days if in session. The President might argue that
Rivers State’s Governor didn’t request help, the crisis was urgent, and
legislative sanction under Section 11(4)[31] covers all measures. Yet,
in A.G. Federation v. A.G. Abia State[32],
the Supreme Court warned against overextending emergency powers beyond their
scope. Suspending officials and appointing an administrator exceeds what Section
305[33]
permits, rendering this justification fragile. Though National Assembly backing
narrows the legal gap.
Historical examples
bolster the President’s stance under critical consideration:
- Western Region
Crisis (1962): Under the 1960 Constitution, Prime
Minister Tafawa Balewa declared an emergency, removed Premier Akintola,
and appointed an administrator. No direct case law challenged this, but it
predates the 1999 Constitution’s stricter framework.
- Plateau and Ekiti
States (2004, 2006): President Obasanjo suspended
Governors Dariye and Fayose, appointing administrators. In A.G. Plateau State v. A.G. Federation[34],
the Supreme Court upheld the emergency but questioned the suspensions’
legality, though political resolution muted further scrutiny.
These precedents suggest
a pattern of executive leeway, but the 1999 Constitution—unlike earlier
versions—imposes tighter controls. Can history override current law?
In the A.G. Plateau
State v. A.G. Federation[35]
case, what the Supreme Court did—striking out the suit on the basis that the
administrator did not authorize its institution—can be described as implicit
recognition or procedural deference to the administrator’s role, without
directly ruling on the substantive legality of the suspension or appointment.
By upholding the objection that the suit lacked the administrator’s
authorization, the court effectively treated the administrator as the
legitimate authority for procedural purposes at that moment.
Supporters of this line
of argument might call this a de facto acceptance of the administrator’s
stabilizing role, arguing that it reflects a practical acknowledgment of the
need for order during the chaos in Plateau State. They could frame it as the
court sanctioning the administrator’s interim control, even if only tacitly,
since the ruling didn’t challenge the suspension or appointment head-on.
The National Assembly’s
invocation of Section 11(4)[36] in Rivers State goes
further, offering explicit legislative endorsement. Supporters might argue this
bridges the constitutional gap, framing the administrator as a necessary
extension of federal authority when state institutions fail. Critics, however, could
counter that Section 11(4)[37] is legislative, not
executive, in scope—sanctioning laws, not appointments.
A Broader Discussion
The Rivers State crisis
transcends legal minutiae; it tests Nigeria’s democratic resilience. The
National Assembly’s sanctioning of the emergency under Section 11(4)[38]
strengthens the President’s hand, suggesting a crisis dire enough to warrant
federal dominance. Yet, if suspensions and administrators become routine,
what prevents this from eroding state autonomy? Section 1(1)[39]
declares the Constitution supreme, yet precedents and legislative support show
political will can bend it. Conversely, if the Constitution paralyzes
federal action, does it risk instability?
The debate hinges on
balance. The Constitution safeguards state autonomy (A.G. Federation v. A.G. Lagos State[40]), but emergencies demand
flexibility. With National Assembly backing, has Rivers State crossed that
threshold, and does the President’s response align with the law’s spirit? History
warns of eroded trust when legality is sidestepped—will this be another
chapter, or does legislative sanction legitimize the shift?
What’s your view? Is this a misstep in crisis management, a power grab cloaked as necessity, or a constitutionally defensible act with National Assembly support? The answers will shape Nigeria’s constitutional trajectory.
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[1] CFRN 1999
[2] CFRN 1999
[3] Ibid
[4] (2002) 6 NWLR
(Pt. 764) 542
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] (2007) 8 NWLR
(Pt. 1036) 332
[8] Ibid
[9] Ibid
[10] (2006) 3 NWLR
(Pt. 967) 346
[11] Ibid
[12] (2013) 16 NWLR
(Pt. 1380) 249
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] (1982) 3 NCLR 703
[16] Ibid
[17] Ibid
[18] (2007) 4 NWLR
(Pt. 1025) 423
[19] Ibid
[20] Ibid
[21] Ibid
[22] Ibid
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid
[25] Ibid
[26] Ibid
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid
[29] Ibid
[30] Ibid
[31] Ibid
[32] Ibid
[33] Ibid
[34] Ibid
[35] Ibid
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid
[40] Ibid
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